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Abstract:  
Avocado is a non-traditional export crop of economic importance in Kenya. Commercialization of 
the fruit through contract farming is a viable alternative for improving the welfare of majority of 
smallholder farmers involved in its production. This paper explores factors influencing the 
participation of smallholder farmers in avocado contract farming and decomposes those 
contributing to differentials in quality and quantities of fruit harvested and sold by contract and 
non-contract farmers.  Findings from a probit analysis indicate that adoption of Hass and Fuerte 
varieties, hired labor, and information on production and marketing significantly influenced 
participation in contract farming. Results from gap analysis, using Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, 
showed that differences between contract and non-contract farmers in quality and quantities of 
harvested and sold were due to endowment and structural differences. The results imply that 
closing the observed gap will require policies aimed at facilitating better access to land and training 
of farmers in good agricultural practices among other support services. 
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In Kenya, avocado is a non-traditional export crop whose auspicious market demand can be 
exploited to build a robust and dynamic agricultural sector (Knopp and Smarzik, 2008). The 
production of avocado is dominated by smallholder farmers who constitute 85% of total growers 
of the fruit in the country (HCDA, 2010). Kenya is an important supplier of avocado to the 
European Union. Compared with many other avocado exporting countries, Although Kenya enjoys 
a unique position due to its production season, with additional advantage emanating from the more 
competitive shipping costs relative to South Africa, which is its African competitor (HCDA, 2010). 
Survival in the global avocado market, however, depends on the establishment of a strong link 
between rising demand for the fruit and the GlobalGap2 certification requirement (Goedhuys and 
Sleuwaegen, 2016). Moreover, Kenya’s inability to adjust her production profile to the evolving 
global demand for Hass variety poses a treat for maintaining her market share (ITC, 2016). This 
unfolding offers a strong case for contract farming as a potential tool for integrating smallholder 
avocado farmers into national and global value chains.   
The government of Kenya, in collaboration with partners such as USAID and Embassy of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, has implemented several programs to improve avocado production, 
quality and the overall export performance of the sector by providing farmers with quality seedlings 
on credit, training them in Good Agricultural Practice (GAP), and linking them to exporters 
through formal contracts.  The programs also found that with the new requirement for Global Gap 
certification, marketing constraints, and high production costs, contract farming offers an 
opportunity through which farmers could benefit from production while also ensuring that the 
country remains competitive in the global market (Solidaridad, et al. 2016). Furthermore, the 
National Agribusiness Strategy (RoK, 2012) has identified contract farming as an important 
pathway for enhancing smallholder access to markets.  
In spite of these interventions, many smallholders are still losing out on the benefits of avocado 
production due to their non-participation in contract farming. Omolo et al. (2011) noted that about 
94 percent of farmers sell their fruit to middle men or brokers who offer relatively low prices.  
Besides the low price, farmers also experience loss in fruit quality due to poor harvesting. The 
reasons for farmers’ participation or non-participation in avocado contract farming are not clear. 
The high percentage of farmers losing out from the benefits of avocado production shows that 
interventions to ensure farmer’s linkage to market through contract farming have not yielded much 
fruit. This suggests that research should go beyond investigating factors influencing participation 
and non-participation to include underlying differences between contract and non-contract 
farmers. 
The general literature and various studies on Kenya (Wainaina et al., 2012); Mwambi et al., 2013; 
Warning and Key, 2002; Birthal et al., 2008; Man and Nawi, 2010; Cahyadi and Waibel (2013) 
and Tatlidil and Akturk (2004) exploring  contract farming incentives did not investigate 
differences between contract and non-contract smallholder farmers in avocado production 
outcomes. Production outcomes such as quality and quantities of avocados produced sold are 
important performance indicators that show the productivity, efficiency and competitiveness of 
                                                             
2GlobalGap is B2B pre-farm gate standard that covers the whole agricultural production process  with a 13-
digit number that uniquely identifies each producer and individual member of a producer group in the 
GLOBALGAP database 
. 
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smallholder avocado production. These outcomes are also planning instruments that could be used 
to improve avocado production, project new markets and the overall sector’s growth rate. Increase 
in avocado production and volume of sales while maintaining avocado quality, increases farmer’s 
income and improves their welfare.  
Given that the quality and quantities of avocados produced and sold are indicators that demand 
driven growth in avocado will create employment opportunities and increase the income of rural 
households, investigating differences between the two groups in these production outcomes and 
identifying underlying factors for these differences provides important additional information for 
policy intervention. This paper therefore emperically analyzes smallholder avocado contract 
farming, determinants and differentials in outcomes between contract and non-contract farmers.  
The paper seek out to answer the following questions: What factors influence smallholder 
participation in avocado contract farming? To what extent do quality and quantities of avocados 
harvested and sold by contract and non-contract smallholder farmers differ? 
This paper contributes to contract farming literature in three ways. First, it analyzes factors 
influencing smallholder participation in avocado contract farming for which there is a dearth of 
information. Second, we have developed a framework for empirical analysis of the factors that can 
be used to explain differences in avocado quality and quantities harvested and sold by contract and 
non-contract farmers taking into account selectivity bias that could result in overestimation of 
contract effect. To the best of our knowledge, rigorous empirical evidence of gap analysis in 
contract farming is scarce. Finally, findings from this study could have policy implications on how 
smallholder avocado farmers can reap maximum benefits from production through contract 
farming given the current high local demand and export potential of the fruit 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of avocado production 
in Kenya. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework used to analyze the determinants of contract 
farming and mean differences in sold and harvested fruit quantities between contract and non-
contract avocado farmers. Section 4 presents the data used for analysis. Section 5 presents the 
empirical analysis and is followed by a section on conclusion. 
 
2. Overview of avocado production in Kenya 
The agricultural sector is the most prominent economic activity in Kenya. In 2016, the sector 
accounted for over 26 percent of the total GDP, 75 percent of the labor force, and over 50 percent 
of the export revenue (KIPPRA, 2017). The horticulture industry, which covers the fruits, 
vegetables and cut-flower sub-sectors, is the most dynamic and fastest growing component of the 
agricultural sector. Avocado is one of the major export crops within the horticultural fruits sub-
sector. In 2015, avocado exports amounted to 31,227 metric tons compared with other major fruit 
exports like mango and passion fruit which registered 14,048 and 404 metric tons respectively 
(Match Maker Associates, 2017). Data from FAOSTAT shows that between 2000 and 2016, the 
area covered by avocado harvest increased from 4.12 to 10.30 hg, yield increased from 126.29 to 
170.83 hg/ha, and production rose from 52.03 to 176.04 tons (FAOSTAT, 2000-2016) 
About 70 percent of avocado fruit is grown in Central and Eastern regions, with the former being 
the leading producer. The main varieties of avocado grown are Hass (20%) and Fuerte (80%). For 
export, the Hass variety accounts for approximately 20 percent while Fuerte accounts for 10 
percent (Horticulture Validated Report, 2014). Avocado farmers are now shifting production from 
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Fuerte to Hass in response to change in demand in the western European market where the ready-
to-eat Hass avocados are favored. 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Theoretical foundations of contract farming 
The popularity of contract farming schemes in developing countries originates from the private-
sector oriented growth strategy of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) introduced in the 1970s. 
Contract farming was envisioned as an institutional framework for transformation of rural 
agriculture by linking smallholders to export markets through the private sector. The theoretical 
basis of contract farming is embedded in the Transaction Cost Theory, which is explained further 
by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) school of thought. Coase’s (1937) seminal paper on 
contract farming posited that all business transactions involve costs resulting mainly from 
uncertainty and asymmetric information.  The two interrelated factors occur mostly in rural areas 
where market failure is pervasive. Contract farming, thus, serves as an effective mechanism for 
reducing the overall cost of farm production as well as lowering risk and market uncertainty 
(Bijman, 2008). However, contract farming has been criticized for leading to social differences 
among smallholder farmers through increased concentration of land ownership and loss of 
independence for the growers (Echanove and Stefen 2005).  
 
On the other hand, the appeal for contract farming as a tool for rural integration through the crop 
export value chain stems from empirical studies, which show that the practice creates production 
incentives for smallholders who may differ in economic and social endowment (Prowse, 2012). 
Empirically, we adopt the non-separable agriculture household model (AHM) by Singh et al. 
(1986). Using this model, farmers’ decision to participate in contract farming can be modeled as a 
utility maximization problem defined as:  
 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐶𝑚 , 𝐶𝑎 , 𝑙𝑖𝑍
ℎ)                                                                                                          (1) 
where 𝑈 is the utility; Cm , aC , il and 
h
Z refer to market purchased goods, farm produced goods, 
leisure, and other household characteristics. The household maximizes utility subject to time 
constraint on the labor allocation equation such that:   
 
𝐿 = 𝐿𝑓𝑐(𝜏) + 𝐿𝑓𝑛𝑐 + 𝐿𝑜𝑓𝑓                                                                                                   (2) 
In Equation 2, the household labor ( L ) is used for on-farm activities for contract ( )L fc  and non-
contract crops L fnc  as well as off-farm labor Loff needs. In addition, the household faces a 
production function q  that is concave and twice differentiable consisting of vector of inputs (X)
which is conditional on contract participation ( ) , farm labor dedicated to contract farming ( fcL ), 
contract participation ( ), and production technology characteristics ( E ). This relationship is 
explained in equation 3. 
 
𝑞 = 𝑞(𝑋(𝜏), 𝐿𝑓𝑐(𝜏), 𝜏, 𝐸) where 0.                                                                             (3) 
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The utility function is subject to a budget constraint as specified by equation 4, such that by 
relaxing the assumption of a perfect market, transaction cost is incorporated into the budget 
constraint through shadow prices.  
 
𝑃𝑠𝐶 + (𝑡𝑐 + 𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑠)𝐶𝑚 = 𝑝𝑠𝑞 − 𝑤𝑋(𝜏) + 𝑤𝑛𝐿𝑜𝑓𝑓 − (𝑡
𝑞 − 𝑝𝑚 + 𝑝𝑠)𝑞𝑚 + 𝑌            (4)                                                                                            
 
where sp and mp  are endogenous shadow price and market price respectively, m aC C C  and 
represents total consumption of purchases and produced goods, ct  and qt  denote transaction in 
purchase and sales of commodities respectively, a mq q q  and denotes total crops produced for 
consumption and marketing, w  and nw  are price of inputs and off-farm wage earned, and Y  
denotes other transfers received by households. Assuming an interior solution, the optimal 
conditions for contract participation are determined by the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions as 
shown in Wooldridge (2002). 
 
Borrowing from literature and theory, the stud hypothesizes that smallholder participation in 
contract farming is influenced by household characteristics which include: age, education level, 
gender of farmer,  household size, agriculture as main occupation;  physical and financial assets 
such as: number of Hass and Fuerte trees owned, value of assets, off-farm income and land 
ownership; social capital includes frequency of attendance in avocado meetings, trust in other 
people, training in avocado agronomy, hired labor and transaction costs proxied by cost of 
marketing avocados, information on avocado production and marketing (Coase, 1937; Mwambi et 
al., 2013). The contract participation model can thus be specified as: 
 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝐹(𝐻, 𝐴𝑖,𝑇𝑖, 𝑆𝑖: 𝛽) + 𝜀𝑖          (5) 
 
where participation (𝑃) is the dependent variable formulated as one if the farmer participates and 
zero otherwise, 𝑖 denotes a farmer, and a nonlinear function F(.) include a vector of covariates that 
include household characteristics(𝐻), physical and financial assets (𝐴), transaction cost (𝑇) and 
social capital (𝑆). 𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be estimated and 𝜀 is the stochastic error term 
assumed to be normally distributed. Both logit and probit models are standard binary dependent 
variable models for estimating probability. The probit model however has the attraction of being 
motivated by a latent normal random variable that lies between   and iX  such that the area 
under the curve represent the probability of participating in avocado contract farming (Cameroon 
and Trivedi, 2005). 
 
3.2 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of differences in mean outcome 
Decomposition aimed at identifying and quantifying the contribution of various factors to changes 
or differences in mean outcome is attributed to the pioneering work of Solow (1957). Since then, 
labor market and wage discrimination researchers have extensively used the Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) 
decomposition model to quantify the contribution of labor, capital, and the unexplained portion 
known as Solow’s residual or total factor productivity to changes in economic growth in several 
countries. This decomposition technique emanates from the seminal works of Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973).  
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Based on a review of empirical literature, we hypothesize that smallholder contract farmers differ 
from non-contract farmers in terms of quality and quantities of avocados harvested and sold 
(Cahyadi and Waibel, 2013; Tatlidil and Akturk, 2004), and that socio-economic factors  
influencing participation in contract farming may directly or indirectly contribute to these 
differences. It is also assumed that farmers’ adoption of different avocado agronomic management 
practices   such as use of inorganic fertilizer and manure, frequency of pruning, and record keeping 
in relation to inputs and production contribute positively to these differences. 
 
The empirical OB regression equation models the relationship between quantities of avocado (
iQ
) harvested and sold by the farmer i   and explanatory variables for both contract and non-contract 
farmers as follows:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖 = {
𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝜀1 𝑖𝑓 𝑐
𝛽0𝑥0 + 𝜀0 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑐
                                    (6) 
 
where 's  are error terms that are assumed to be normally distributed while c and nc  denote 
contract and non-contract farming. Following Jann (2008), the difference or gap in quantity of 
avocado produced and sold (𝑄𝑛 − 𝑄𝑛𝑐),as per equation 6, can be decomposed into three parts as 
follows: 
_ _
Q Q ( X X ) X ( ) ( X X )( )c nc nc c ncn nc nc c nc c nc
Endowment Coefficient Interaction
Effect Effect Effect
                  (7) 
 
Where the endowment effect (or explained effect) represents differences between contract and 
non-contract farmers in quantities produced and sold due to differences in the level of observable 
covariates. The coefficient effect, commonly referred to as returns or structural effect, measures 
the outcome of non-contract farmers if their endowments were rewarded as contract farmers. The 
interaction effect is due to the simultaneous change of endowment and estimated coefficient. 
Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) have shown that with adjustment, the decomposition (equation 7) can 
be amended to incorporate the selectivity term to correct for selection bias as follows: 
 
_ _ _ _ _^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Q Q X' ( ) ( X X ) ( )nc c ncn nc ncnc c c nc c nc
Coefficient Endowment Selectivity
                                                 (8) 
 
The selectivity term measures the contribution of selection effects to the observed gap in quantities 
of avocado harvested and sold. 
 
3.3 Variable Measurement and Summary Statistics 
The dependent variable for participation decision is a dummy which equals one if a household 
participated in avocado contract farming and zero otherwise. Transition and non-contract farmers 
were classified as non-contract farmers and those with established contracts as contract farmers. 
This grouping was necessitated by preliminary analysis which indicated that transition and non-
contract farmers had more commonalities in various characteristics than contract farmers; and 
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although transition farmers had formed groups, most of them had not yet signed any contract 
agreements.  
 
For difference in participation between smallholder contract and non-contract farming, the 
dependent variables are the mean difference in quality and quantities of avocados harvested and 
sold. Avocados are sold per piece according to traditional parameters such as size, shape of the 
variety and quality. Quality considerations include skin color, external skin defects and maturity. 
Farmers were asked about the quantities of avocados harvested, quality and quantities sold. 
Avocado quality was coded as a categorical variable with 1 indicating high quality, 2 
medium/normal quality and 3 low quality. Since both high and medium/normal are usually the 
quality grades purchased by exporters or supermarkets, high and medium qualities were combined 
and recoded as dummy with one representing good quality avocados sold and zero as low quality.  
Approximately 8,780 avocados were harvested by farmers while 7,777 pieces were sold. Contract 
farmers however harvested and sold 10,832 and 9,820 pieces while their non-contract counterparts 
harvested and sold 7,738 and 6,739 pieces. About 63 percent of contract farmers rated their avocados 
sold as high or normal quality while this was true for 42 percent of non-contract farmers 
 
The explanatory variables used for this analysis are based on empirical literature. Table 1 contains 
mean comparison tests for contract and non-contract farmers. Contract and non-contract farmers 
did not differ in educational attainment, household size, and main occupation as farmers. The mean 
age of non-contract participants was 60 years, but contract participants were two years older. The 
asset value of contract farmers was twice as much as that of the non-contract farmers.  
Contract farmers also owned 21 percent more acres, have thrice as much productive Hass trees, 
received more information on avocado production and marketing and had more household 
members trained in avocado agronomy than their non-contract counterparts. 
 
Farmers on average spent 65 cents per piece to market their avocados but contract farmers spent 8 
times more and hired about 66 percent of labor for production while non-contract participants hired 
only 43 percent of labor. Contract farmers were more frequent at avocado group meetings than 
non-contract participants. Questions of farmer’s trust in other people were aggregated as an index. 
The reasoning behind a possible association of trust and contract farming is that people, who in 
general trust that others will look after their interests, have fewer concerns about the risk and 
uncertainty of entering contract agreement. The trust index however revealed no significant 
difference in their trust and perception of other people. Contract farmers applied on average 5.75 
kg of fertilizer and pesticide, while only 4.16 kg was applied by non-contract farmers. Eighty eight 
percent of contract farmers grafted their avocado trees while this was true for only 75 percent of 
non-contract farmers. The two groups also differed in the frequency of tree pruning and record 
keeping on inputs used and production. 
 
4. Data 
The data for the empirical analysis was collected as part of a research project on ‘Productive 
Employment in the Segmented Markets (PRESM) for Fresh Produce’ funded by the Dutch Science 
Foundation (NWO) and implemented by the Partnership for Economic Policy (PEP), in 
collaboration with the VU-University of Amsterdam and Amsterdam Institute for International 
Development (AIID), University of Nairobi, Fresh Produce and Exporters Association of Kenya 
(FPEAK), and PRIME-ITC (coordinated by LEI Wageningen UR) in November–December 2015. 
African Journal of Economic Review, Volume VII, Issue 2, July 2019 
98 
 
A multistage sampling approach was used to select the county, sub-county, villages and 
households. In the first stage Murang’a County in Central region of Kenya was purposefully 
selected because it is the main avocado producing counties in Kenya. Kandara sub-county was 
then selected in the second stage from seven sub-counties of Murang’a County. This sub-county 
was selected because it is one of the main avocado producing sub-counties in Muranga and the 
County government has thrown its weight behind avocado production. Besides, the County has 
experienced substantial expansion in avocado production over the previous ten years in both 
volume and exports and therefore was found to provide an interesting case study to analyze the 
implications for rural development. 
 
Three main household groups based on their participation status regarding the avocado marketing 
contracts were selected in the third stage. The first group covered farmers involved in contract 
farming; the second group comprised of farmers who had new contractual arrangements with 
Small and Medium Enterprises from the 2016 avocado season; the third group contained farmers 
without contracts who sold their avocado to middle men or brokers. A sampling frame of all 
avocado farmers in the area was provided by the Kandara sub-county agricultural office.  From 
the sampling frame 266 contract farmers were sampled. Those who had just signed contracts 
consisted of four farmer groups, each consisting of 50-60 farmers. From this group, 30-40 farmers 
were randomly sampled from each farmer group totaling up to 144 farmers. A total of 380 farmers 
without contracts were also randomly sampled from the list.  
 
The survey instruments consisted of two questionnaires. A household questionnaire was 
administered to all households in the sample while a Farmers’ Organization (FO) instrument was 
administered to all households engaged in avocado framers group. The household questionnaire 
collected information on the number of mature avocado trees owned, household demographic 
composition and resources, various income sources and a variety of household contextual 
characteristics. Information was also collected on avocado production and marketing, knowledge 
of avocado farmers’ agronomy, harvesting, marketing, access to credit and banking. The 
respondents were also asked to rate their trust in other people with regards to reliability, meeting 
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 N= 266  
All farmers  
N=790   
Independent variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD T- stat 
Age of farmer (years) 60.55 13.95 62.44 13.39 61.19 13.78 -1.82* 
Gender dummy (Male=1) 0.77 0.42 0.82 0.38 0.79 0.41 -1.61 
Household size (no of persons) 3.59 1.84 3.67 1.77 3.62 1.82 -0.57 
Education of household head (years) 7.85 3.94 8.22 3.50 7.97 3.80 -1.30 
Main occupation of household head 
(farming=1; 0 otherwise) 0.87 0.34 0.88 0.33 0.87 0.33 -0.46 
Value of  assets (Ksh) 29,431.7 73105.0 60,655.3 165330.0 39,944.9 113759.5 -3.67*** 
Non-farm income(Ksh) 108,513.6 240115.3 111,685.8 158,795.8 109,581.7 216,076.9 -0.19 
Total land owned (acre) 1.96 1.82 2.37 2.11 2.10 1.93 -2.86*** 
Number of productive Hass  tress 5.61 12.13 14.49 19.66 8.60 15.65 -7.82*** 
Number of productive Fuerte  trees 4.71 9.07 5.83 8.46 5.09 8.88 -1.69* 
Received information on prod. & 
marketing (yes=1) 0.20 0.40 0.35 0.48 0.25 0.43 -4.48*** 
Household member rec. training in 
avocado prod. year (yes=1) 0.23 0.42 0.74 0.44 0.40 0.49 
-
15.98*** 
Cost of marketing avocados 
(Ksh/piece) 0.02 0.08 0.16 17.98 0.65 12.09 -9.98*** 
Hired labor (yes=1) 0.43 0.50 0.66 0.47 0.51 0.50 -6.14*** 
Frequency of avocado meeting 
attendance (no. in a year) 8.06 4.12 12.85 12.15 10.01 7.96 -4.71*** 
Trust in other people (index) 0.57 0.13 0.58 0.13 0.58 0.13  
Household member rec. training in 
avocado prod. year (yes=1)        0.20    0.40    0.35 0.48     0.25 0.43 -4.48*** 
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Fertilizer & pesticide application 
rate (kg/tree) 4.16 2.54 5.72 1.92 4.68 2.46 
-
8.787*** 
Grafting  of trees (yes=1) 0.74 0.44 0.88 0.33 0.79 0.41 -4.52*** 
Pruning at least once a year (yes=1) 0.56 0.50 0.70 0.46 0.61 0.49 
-
3.737*** 
Record keeping on input used & 
prod  (yes=1) 0.07 0.25 0.16 0.37 0.10 0.30 
-
4.007*** 
Asterisks ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
5. Empirical results and discussion  
The average marginal effects from the probit model are presented in Table 2. Preliminary 
diagnostic tests for multicollinearity ruled out the existence of collinearity amongst the variables. 
The probit model correctly predicted 87 percent of the observed outcome with most variables 
showing high significance levels. A Wald Chi-square value of 126.55, significant at 1 percent, was 
an indication that our model fit the data well. The Pearson or Hosmer-Lemeshow‘s goodness of fit 
test returned a probability greater than the Chi square value of 0.8757. Classification test of model 
sensitivity and specificity with a cut-off of 0.5 percent also showed a high model fit.  
 
The result revealed that the age of the house head was positive and significant, showing that as 
farmers grew older and gained more experience in avocado farming, they become more confident 
to participate in contract farming.  Household assets were significant and positive, implying that 
assets aid and increase the chances of farmer’s participating in contract farming. This finding 
corroborates the study of Warning and Key (2002) who found a significant and positive effect of 
assets on peanut contract farming in Senegal. Mwambi et al. (2013) however found no significant 
relationship for poultry farming in Kenya.  
 
Furthermore, an increase in the number of productive Hass trees increased the chance of 
participating in contract farming by 0.5 percentage points. This result can be explained by the fact 
that Hass is the most preferred avocado variety for export. Reason being that Hass is less prone to 
pests and disease attacks and has a longer shelf-life compared to Fuerte. As such, farmers with 
more Hass trees belong to a contract scheme as this increases their chances of participating in the 
export market.  The result for the number of Fuerte trees was positive, but insignificant. This is 
probably due to the low export demand for Fuerte avocados which may not provide adequate 
incentives for farmers to participate in contract farming. 
 
Hiring labor for avocado production and marketing was positively correlated with avocado 
contract farming, suggesting that as more farmers join contracts, there is a higher likelihood of 
hiring more workers. This is an indication that the sector could generate employment by using 
family labor as well as hired labor.  A one percent increase in the cost of marketing avocados 
increased the probability of participating in contract farming by 63 percentage points. The 
perishability of avocados coupled with the cost of transporting the fruit probably explains why 
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most non-contract farmers sell their avocados at the farm gate at relatively lower prices.  Hence, 
farmers who live in remote areas may find additional security in contract farming.  This finding is 
in line with (Wang et al. 2014; Leung et al. (2008). Wainaina et al. (2012) however found that the 
distance to market reduced the likelihood of contract participation for poultry farmers in Kenya.  
 
The frequency of meeting attendance in avocado group meetings significantly influenced contract 
participation and received marketing and production information increased the likelihood of 
smallholder participation in contract farming by 1.1 percentage points. This suggests that although 
being a group member is a necessary step to contract participation, active participation in the group 
through meeting attendance leads to more social interactions and group commitment to participate 
and upholding contract agreements. The acquisition of specialized information is vital for 
enhancing avocado quality and better prices for farmers. Man and Nawi (2010) made similar 
conclusion on access to information on production and marketing of vegetable contract farming in 
Malaysia.  
 
Table 2: Probit regression of Factors influencing Participation in Avocado Contract 
Farming 
    
Maximum Likelihood 
 Estimates     
Average 
 Marginal Effects  
  
 
Coeff SE P-value 
 
Coeff         SE 
Age of household head (years) 
 
0.010 0.005 0.026 
 
0.002** 0.001 
Gender dummy (Male=1) 
 
-0.112 0.134 0.403 
 
-0.027 0.032 
Household size (no. of  
 
0.043 0.034 0.200 
 
0.011 0.008 
Education of household head 
(years 
 
-0.001 0.017 0.962 
 
0.000 0.004 
Main occupation of household 
(Farming=1) 
 
-0.146 0.177 0.409 
 
-0.035 0.043 
No of productive Hass trees 
 
0.022 0.006 0.000 
 
0.005*** 0.001 
No of productive Fuerte trees 
 
-0.002 0.007 0.817 
 
0.000 0.002 
Land owned (acre) 
 
0.011 0.030 0.720 
 
0.003 0.007 
ln total assets (Ksh) 
 
0.028 0.056 0.621 
 
0.007** 0.014 
Non-farm income (Ksh) 
 
-0.005 0.019 0.812 
 
-0.001 0.005 
Credit constrained (yes=1) 
 
0.003 0.153 0.984 
 
0.001 0.037 
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Hired labor (yes=1) 
 
0.003 0.001 0.000 
 
0.001*** 0.000 
Cost of transporting avocado to 
market (Ksh) 
 
2.609 0.896 0.004 
 
0.631*** 0.211 
Trust in other people (index) 
 
0.176 0.402 0.661 
 
0.043 0.097 
Frequency of avocado meeting 
attendance (no. in a year) 
 
0.015 0.007 0.030 
 
0.004** 0.002 
Rec. information on avocado 
production & marketing (yes=1) 
 
0.044 0.158 0.050 
 
0.011** 0.038 
House member rec. training on 
avocado prod. year (yes=1)   1.118 0.136 0.000   0.270*** 0.030 
Constant 
 
-2.458 0.716 0.001 
   
Number of observations                                                                                         777 
Wald chi2(18)                                                                                                      237.45 
Prob > chi2                                                                                                           0.0000 
Pseudo R2                                                                                                             0.3270 
Pearson or Hosmer–Lemeshow ‘s test (Prob > chi2)                                          0.8647 
Correct classification                                                                                            82.03%  
Asterisks ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Preliminary analysis showed that contract farmers were different from their non-contract 
counterparts in quantities of avocado harvested and quality sold. To delineate these gaps and 
explore the extent to which individual covariates contribute to these differences, Oaxaca-Blinder 
(OB) decomposition technique was used as outlined in the methodology section. The OB 
decomposition is based on regression analysis that proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, group-
specific regressions models were estimated for avocado quality, quantities harvested and sold. In 
the second stage, mean values, and estimated parameters from the first stage regression were used 
for decomposition. Non-contract farmers were defined as the counterfactual group of interest from 
whose perspective the results are reported.  
 
Two equations were estimated for checking robustness.  In the first estimation, the inverse Mills 
ratio was calculated from the probit model of participation and included in the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition as an additional variable in the production outcomes equations. The coefficients of 
the inverse Mills ratio were however insignificant in the quality and quantities of avocados sold 
estimates. In the quantities harvested equation, the inverse Mills ratio equations showed a marginal 
significance for only the endowment component of the individual variable contribution whiles the 
coefficient and interaction effects were insignificant. Even with the marginal significance in the 
endowment variable, the signs of the coefficients were not intuitive. The analysis therefore 
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proceeded with the OLS estimator for the OB decomposition. The first stage results were not 
presented because the interest was on the second stage. They can however be available upon 
request.  
The OB decomposition results presented in Table 3 gives the mean predictions for contract and 
non-contract farmers, gap and its components (the endowment, coefficient and interaction effects) 
for quantities of avocados harvested, quality and quantities sold. The mean predictions and gaps 
for the three outcome variables were statistically significant at 0.01% level. In quantities harvested, 
both the endowment effect,  i.e  the proportion of gap due to differences in observable 
characteristics between contract and non-contract farmers, and the coefficient or structural effect, 
i.e. the portion of the gap attributed to the returns of the same observable and unobservable 
characteristics were both positive and statistically significant at one percent and ten percent 
respectively. The endowment effect contributed about 93.1 percent [(0.463/0.497)*100] to the 
overall gap while 58.4 percent. [(0.290/0.497)*100] was attributed to the coefficient effect.  The 
gap was however lowered by the interaction effect by 51.5% [(-0.256/0.497)*100]. The 
interpretation of the interaction effect is however ambiguous since it captures both observable and 
unobservable effects. For quantities sold, the endowment effect accounted for 102 percent of the 
overall gap. The decomposition result for avocado quality sold contrasted with those in quantities 
harvested and sold. Only the coefficient effect was statistically significant and accounted for 70.6 
percent of the overall gap. The endowment gap is consistent with most treatment effect literature 
on contract farming (Wainaina et al. 2012; Cahyadi and Waibel 2013; Warning and Key 2002) 
and study by Tatlidi and Akturk (2004).   
The positive and significant endowment effects noted for both quantities of avocados harvested 
and sold and the marginal significant coefficient effects are indications that avocado contract 
farmers enjoy both endowment and structural advantage over their non-contract counterparts. The 
positive and larger endowment contribution may probably be because contract farmer asset levels 
are twice larger than non-contract farmers as indicated in the descriptive statistics. The positive 
and significant large coefficient effect suggests that difference in avocado quality was mainly due 
to the structural disadvantages of non-contract farmers in returns to observable and unobservable 
characteristics. The results suggests that even though equalizing resources between the two groups 
is a necessary condition for reducing the gap in quantities harvested and sold, it is not a sufficient 
condition for reducing the gap in avocado quality. Thus understanding the sources of these gaps is 
important for policies that would ensure avocado farmers receive adequate benefits from both 
endowment and the returns to their endowments. Detailed contribution of individual covariates 
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Table 3:  OLS Oaxaca-Blinder Aggregate Decomposition of Total Harvest, Sales and 
Quality 
    
Quantity 
harvested   
Quantity 


























































Share of total gap  (93.2%)  (102.1%)  (4.5%) 





















    (0.256)   (0.254)   (0.077) 
Share of total gap  (51.5%)  (-70.9%)  (24.9%) 








A detailed decomposition of variables contributing to the gap in production outcomes between 
contract and non-contract farmers presented in Table 4 shows a clear contribution of the number 
of productive Hass trees owned, total land owned, household member received training in avocado 
agronomy, fertilizer and pesticide application rate as well as grafting of avocado trees, hired labor 
and pruning of trees at least once a year to the endowment gap. The descriptive statistics lends 
support to the contribution of these variables in widening the gap between avocado contract 
farmers and their independent counterparts. The positive and significant coefficient of Hass trees 
owned and household members received training in avocado agronomy showed that contract 
farmers are reaping higher returns from these endowments. On the other hand, the negative and 
significant effect of land owned, cost of transporting avocados to market and frequency of avocado 
group meeting attendance in the coefficient effect reduced the gap in quantities harvested.  This 
suggests that non-contract farmers may have some structural advantage in quantities of avocados 
harvested. 
 
Notably, these variables also contributed to the gap in quantities harvested. This is an indication 
that there is a close linkage between the production and marketing processes. Low yields result in 
lower quantities sold and income. The positive sign of information received on production in the 
endowment effect and the negative sign in coefficient effect could mean that, although non-
contract farmers maybe disadvantaged in terms of endowment to production and marketing 
information, they may have possibly benefited from spill-over effect of information flow which 
reduced the gap in quantities sold.  
 
In the coefficient effect, years of educational, the number of productive Fuerte trees owned, and 
cost of transporting avocados to market were also favorable to non-contract farmers in reducing 
the gap. The significant effect of Fuerte in reducing the gap could be due to the current expansion 
of fruit outlets where the local Fuerte variety is mostly sold. The contribution of transport cost in 
lowering the gap could probably be because non-contract farmers mostly sell their produce at the 
farm gate thus accruing some advantage in terms of transport cost. Also in the case of land, non-
contract farmers could have scale requirement where they could split their land for commercial 
avocado production and also produce other crops for sale or consumption. Hence, policy for 
enhancing avocado sales should focus on strengthening areas where non-contract farmers have 
relative advantage and thus closing the endowment gap.  
 
The age of the household, education, farming as main occupation, training received by household 
members and recording keeping on inputs and production were positive and significant in the 
coefficient or returns effect. The descriptive analysis in Table 2 showed that at 10 percent 
significant level, contract farmers were on average older than noncontract farmers. The difference 
in age endowment could perhaps reflect the returns to experience in avocado farming and quality 
produced by contract farmers. Although the descriptive statistics showed no significant difference 
between contract and non-contract farmers in terms of education and main occupation, contract 
farmers had more years of education and more of them had farming as their main occupation. This 
perhaps also explains the difference in returns of these variables in contributing to the gap in 
avocado quality sold. Avocado agronomy training received by household member and keeping 
records on input used and production also positively contributed to the gap in avocado quality. 
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This shows that enhancing human capital through training and extension services is essential for 
the quality of avocados produced and sold. 
 
Table 4: Variables Contributing to Net Gap in Avocado Quality, Harvested and Sold 
Quantities 







Quantities Harvested  Coeff  Coef.  Coef. 
Variables       







































 Hired labor (yes=1)  0.036*  -0.230  -0.047 
  (0.021)  (0.119)  (0.058) 
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Group meeting attendance (no. 













Fertilizer and pesticide 
application rate (kg/tree)  0.033**  -0.058  -0.011 
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Quality Sold       
Age of household head (years)  0.016  0.591***  -0.017 
  (0.011)  (0.211)  (0.011) 
Education of household head 
(years)   0.009  0.265***  -0.014 
  (0.007)  (0.098)  (0.010) 
Main occupation of household 
head (farming=1)  0.001  0.182*  -0.003 
  (0.003)  (0.107)  (0.005) 


























House member  rec. training in 






















    (0.008)   (0.021)   (0.014) 








This paper has empirically analyzed determinants of participation in smallholder avocado contract 
farming and differentials in production outcomes between contract farming and non-contract 
farmers using data from 266 contract farmers and 524 non-contract farmers from Murang’a County 
of Kenya.  The results of our investigation showed that the number of Hass avocado trees owned, 
household assets, hired labor, training in avocado agronomy, information received on avocado 
production and marketing, cost of transporting avocados and frequency of avocado meeting 
attendance were important determinant of contract participation.  
 
Gap analysis from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for avocado quality and quantities of 
avocados harvested and sold by contract and non-contract farmers, revealed that a large portion of 
the gap in quantities of avocados harvested and sold were mostly explained by the endowment 
effect while the gap in avocado quality was due to the coefficient effect or returns to endowments. 
This suggests that interventions aimed at enhancing smallholder avocado commercialization 
should go beyond resource equalization to encompass programs that would enable non-contract 
farmers get returns from endowments as their contract counterparts.  
 
The implication of this finding is that Kenya’s competitiveness in the global avocado market is 
dependent on the alignment of production to the increasing demand for Hass variety fruit quality 
assurance which could be achieved through contract farming. Thus policy makers should ensure a 
wider scope of smallholder participation in avocado contract farming by encouraging farmers to 
take advantage of this growth opportunity to invest in Hass avocado farming. Other support 
services like training in avocado agronomy, innovative system of information dissimilation on new 
production techniques, marketing channels and prices and creating cheaper means of 
transportation for farmers to transport avocados to market would not only encourage participation 
in contract farming but also help preserve the quality considering the perishability of the fruit.  
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